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Abstract
Job rotation as an important element of labour market policy has only a rather
short tradition in most Member States of the European Union, except in the
scandinavian countries. The transnational partnership "job rotation" was
founded at the end of 1995 and financing for job rotation projects came mainly
from the Community Initiative ADAPT, but also from the European Structural
Funds. Job rotation here is defined as the combination of further training for the
employed and substitution by a previously unemployed person. In the non-
scandinavian countries manifold local initiatives were started, which operate
under very heterogeneous institutional and financial national frameworks. For
these reasons a solely quantitative comparison of results of the individual
projects may be misleading. We attempt to analyse and compare in this study
the legal, political and financial preconditions on the national and local level as
well as the relevant incentives for the firm of job rotation projects.
The research strategy of the study initially identifies the major key areas for
job rotation projects, which can be deduced from the theory of transitional
labour markets. Based on hypotheses about the necessary framework for
success of job rotation we then confront these hypotheses with both
quantitative and qualitative indicators in a third step. For example, the legal
framework is compared on the basis of indicators on the existence of a right to
further training for the employed and unemployed, legal obligations or a levy on
firms for further training of their employees, dismissal protection legislation in
case an employees takes a longer leave as well as the potential use of already
existing regulation of active labour market policies for job rotation project. We
compare Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, United
Kingdom and Germany.
The major results are:
1. far-reaching legal or collectively agreed regulations regarding further training
for the employed and practice-oriented training for the unemployed and for
sections of the non-working population are a necessary precondition for a
wider spread of job rotation;
2. incentives for the substitution persons should be clearly positive and through
an adequate reimbursement for substitution work, a sufficient increase in
comparison to unemployment benefits needs to be assured;
3. costs incurred through job rotation projects should be ‘fairly’ distributed
through a suitable co-funding structure in order to keep the so-called
‘deadweight’ effects as low as possible,
4. incentives for employees to undergo further training must be guaranteed
through the existence of appropriate regulations and leave of absence for
the purpose of improving one’s skills must be flanked by secure dismissal
protection legislation;
5. functional regional policy networks are necessary in order to implement the
projects on the interface between labour market policy and structural policy;
6. job rotation in (not only) Germany could gain a new impetus through the
wider spread of further training funds based on collective agreements
including elements of job rotation and complemented through additional
funding by labour market policy or tax reductions to participating firms.
Under such a framework job rotation could make a stronger contribution to
the reduction of unemployment by at the same time reaching higher
productivity.
Zusammenfassung
Jobrotation als wichtiges Element der Arbeitsmarktpolitik hat in den meisten
Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Union, mit Ausnahme der skandinavischen
Länder, eine kurze Tradition. Erst Ende 1995 wurde die transnationale Partner-
schaft "Jobrotation" auf europäischer Ebene angeregt und Projektfinanzierung
hauptsächlich durch die Gemeinschaftsinitiative ADAPT, aber auch aus den
europäischen Strukturfonds ermöglicht. Jobrotation bezeichnet dabei die
Verbindung von Weiterbildung für Beschäftigte und Stellvertretung durch zuvor
Arbeitslose. In den nichtskandinavischen Ländern der EU wurden daraufhin
eine Vielzahl an lokalen Initiativen gestartet, die unter sehr heterogenen institu-
tionellen und finanziellen Rahmenbedingungen ihre Arbeit aufnahmen. Da aus
diesen Gründen ein rein quantitativer Vergleich der Ergebnisse der Einzelpro-
jekte nur schwer möglich ist, versucht diese Studie die jeweiligen Startbedin-
gungen, die rechtlichen, politischen, finanziellen Rahmenbedingungen auf
nationaler und lokaler Ebene sowie die betrieblich relevanten Voraussetzungen
für Jobrotationsprojekte zu untersuchen.
Das Untersuchungsdesign der Studie identifiziert zunächst die wichtigsten
möglichen Problemfelder für Jobrotationsprojekte, abgeleitet aus der Theorie
der Übergangsarbeitsmärkte, und versucht daraus hypothetische Erfolgsbedin-
gungen abzuleiten, die dann in einem dritten Schritt mit jeweils mehreren
quantitativen und qualitativen Erfolgsindikatoren zusammengeführt werden.
Das Feld der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen wird beispielsweise inhaltlich
verglichen anhand von Indikatoren zur Existenz eines Rechts auf
Weiterbildung für Beschäftigte und Arbeitslose, gesetzliche Verpflichtungen
oder Abgaben für Unternehmen zur Weiterbildung ihrer Beschäftigten,
Kündigungsschutz bei längerer Freistellung sowie die Anwendbarkeit von
existierenden Regelungen aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik für die Durchführung von
Jobrotation. Die untersuchten Länder sind Dänemark, Finnland, Frankreich,
Italien, Österreich, Portugal, Schweden, Vereinigtes Königreich und
Deutschland.
Die wichtigsten Ergebnisse:
1. Weitreichende rechtliche oder tarifliche Regelungen bezüglich
Weiterbildung für Beschäftigte und praxisnahe Aus- oder Weiterbildung für
Arbeitslose und Teile der inaktiven Bevölkerung sind eine
Grundvoraussetzung für eine breite Anwendungsbasis von Jobrotation;
2. Anreize für Beschäftigte, an Weiterbildung teilzunehmen, müssen durch die
Existenz von entsprechenden Regelungen gewährleistet sein. Die Weiter-
bildungsfreistellungen sollten durch Arbeitsplatzsicherheit flankiert werden
3. Kosten, die durch Jobrotationsprojekte anfallen, sollten durch eine entspre-
chende Kofinanzierungsstruktur möglichst auch entsprechend den entste-
henden Vorteilen verteilt sein, um Mitnahmeeffekte möglichst gering zu
halten;
4. leistungsgerechte Entlohnung der Tätigkeit als Stellvertreter/in ist ein wichti-
ger Motivationsfaktor, d.h. ein ausreichender Abstand zwischen dem Niveau
der Lohnersatzleistung und dem Entgelt für die Stellvertretung ist erforder-
lich;
5. funktionsfähige regionale Netzwerke der arbeitsmarktpolitischen und wirt-
schaftlichen Akteure sind notwendig für eine günstige Implementations-
struktur;
6. Jobrotationsprojekte in Deutschland könnten durch eine Verbreitung von
tarifvertraglich geregelten Weiterbildungsfonds mit Jobrotationselementen
und arbeitsmarktpolitischer oder steuerlich begünstigter Ergänzungsförde-
rung, eine neue Dynamik erhalten. So könnte Jobrotation einen stärkeren
Beitrag leisten zur Verringerung der Arbeitslosigkeit bei gleichzeitig erreich-
baren Produktivitätsgewinnen.
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11. Introduction
Job rotation
 is a special form of combining further training for company
employees and unemployed persons whereby the vacated workplaces are filled
by unemployed substitutes during the further training period. Job rotation was
first introduced in the 80’s in Denmark and was then over the following years
further developed and implemented on a nation-wide scale.1 At the end of 1995
the transnational partnership ”Job rotation – A new method in Europe” was
established with the aim of testing this system in all Member States of the EU.
The partnership initially comprised of 30 partner organisations in 14 countries.
Job rotation can be seen as an innovative combination of structural and
employment policies corresponding to the strategy of the transitional labour
markets.2 As a structural policy measure on the one hand, the qualification
deficits of a company’s staff are improved, while on the other hand, thanks to
training and temporary jobs for the unemployed, qualifications and placement
chances are increased. These two aspects are reflected in the financial and
institutional 3 framework conditions for job rotation.
Job rotation projects are frequently co-financed by national and EU
funding. On the European level, funding is primarily drawn from the community
initiative Adapt, but also from Objective 1 to Objective 4 of the European
Structural Funds4. Adapt was established in 1994 following the results of
studies which showed that the European employment systems had lower
performance levels than Japan and the USA (European Commission 1993 and
1997).
In Europe the majority of new jobs are created in small to medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs). Since these firms, in comparison to large companies, offer
lesser opportunities for further training, they are among those most threatened
by global industrial changes. Employees of SMEs are one of the most important
target groups for the community initiative Adapt. Adapt’s intent is to help
                                           
1 Similar substitution model projects were also successfully implemented in Norway and
Sweden in the early 90’s (cf.. Festoe 1998, Lindberg 1995).
2
cf. Schmid (1993).
3 The term ”institution” used in this study is based on the comprehension of institutions as
”manifestation forms or symbol nets for regular activities or customs which are used publicly
and have been socio-historically set for a ‘relevant duration’” (Waschkuhn 1985: 376).
4 The main aim of the European Structural Funds is to create economic and social cohesion
within the European Union through six objectives. Objective 3 comprises of the battle against
unemployment, the integration of young persons and those excluded from paid labour and
the creation of equal opportunities between men and women. Objective 4 deals with helping
the employed to adapt to changes in industries and production structures.
2businesses and their employees to tackle the demands and effects of industrial
changes and thus to safeguard and increase employment standards. The aims
of this initiative are to accelerate the economy’s acclimatisation to the structural
changes (1), to increase competition in trade and industry (2), to avoid
unemployment by improving qualifications (3) and to hasten the creation of new
jobs (4). These aims are to be predominantly fulfilled by the development of
human resources. The initiative will continue until the end of the year 2000 and
has a total budget of ECU 2.940 Million (DM 5.820 Million)5. Job rotation has
been selected by Adapt as a model project and is receiving special support. (cf.
EUROPS and European Commission: Internet6).
On the national level on other hand, there are several different funding
models for job rotation projects and these models depend on the individual
national institutional framework conditions. Since, apart from the differing levels
of funding, the European framework conditions for the implementation of the job
rotation projects are qualitatively similar, we are deducing that the differing
national results are due to the individual national institutional and financial
conditions.
                                           
5 The distribution of the Adapt budget for the individual countries and the proportion of national
co-funding can be seen in Table 1: 2.5.
6 http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/dg05/esf/en/public/sr_adapt/sr_hor.htm
http://www.europs.be/de/progci.htm.
32. Aim of the study
The successful implementation of job rotation as an innovative combination of
structural and employment policies is, due to its complexity, particularly
dependent on the individual national institutional framework conditions. The
aim of this study is to identify the conditions for successful job rotation, to
identify the most important indicators which distinguish these institutional and
financial framework conditions and then, using these indicators, to describe
and assess the framework conditions for job rotation in the individual countries.
The research design for this study is based on hypotheses which were
developed from the analysis of the various project planning phases for typically
ideal job rotation projects. For this an inductive method was selected. This
method was derived from the ten phases of a typical job rotation project – as
agreed upon in the transnational module for job rotation project management7.
In a general overview, these project phases – with the concrete experiences
and problems of the parties involved – were set in correlation and analysed..8 A
questionnaire was sent to certain co-ordination agencies (mainly Adapt
projects) in the countries being surveyed in September 1998 to gain additional
information.9
The experiences gained from the Danish example of successful, nation-
wide implementation of job rotation projects set the analytical starting point for
the study (European Commission 1997b). Each of the ten different project
phases of job rotation bear particular problems, but also have a number of
essential prerequisites in common which play a vital role in the success or
failure of a project.
On analysing the various phases of a typical job rotation project, six
different key areas were identified which were of particular importance for the
                                           
7 The progress of a typical job rotation project can be defined in 10 phases: Preparation;
Contracts; Application phase; Information; Detailed planning; Recruitment phase; Carrying
out the job rotation project; Implementation of new skills; Evaluation; Perspectives for new
projects (cf. AOF Faglige Skole, Silkeborg, DK, Hans Bechgaard).
8 Conferences on the job rotation theme, discussions with experts and literature evaluation
about initial job rotation experiences (Moraal 1998, Uhrig 1998, Fietz 1998, SPI 1997-1998)
proved especially helpful here.
9 Bettina Uhrig (SPI) was of invaluable help in carrying out this questionnaire-based survey.
Special thanks for co-operating go to SPI (Berlin), Arcidonna (Palermo, Italy), Direccao Geral
dos Assuntos Consulares e Comunidades Portuguesas (Lisbon, Portugal), EU–Jobrotation
Secretariat (Aalborg, Denmark), Glasgow Development Agency (Edinburgh, Scotland), Milton
Keynes College (Buckinghamshire, England), Länsarbetsnämnden (Örebro, Sweden), ÖSB
Unternehmensberatung GmbH (Vienna, Austria), University of Helsinki - Lahti Research and
Training Centre (Lahti, Finland).
4development of the projects. On the basis of these key areas, a second stage
then developed hypothetical requirements for the success of job rotation
projects. In the third stage, these prerequisites for success were developed
and, using the data on the institutional framework conditions in nine countries,
the established indicators for success of job rotation could be examined.10 The
final stage at the end of the study deals with the evaluation of the results and
the formation of conclusions. Figure 1 shows an overview of the various study
phases to identify the prerequisites for the successful implementation of job
rotation.
A evaluation design was then established on the basis of these four
working stages (see Figure 2) showing six different key areas of the study. The
key areas (Column A) are assigned to the success prerequisites (Column B)
which are then assigned to the corresponding indicators (Column C). Table 1
(Appendix) shows a more detailed list of the indicators and their significance in
the different countries. Chapter 3 deals with the elements and features of the
individual key areas and the necessary conditions for success, along with their
indicators, are described in more detail.
The institutional and financial framework conditions in the individual
countries for job rotation are analysed and compared in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is
a summarised assessment of the analysis on hand and outlines, on a more
abstract level, the favourable conditions for job rotation as well as presenting
their pragmatic equivalents. This chapter also gives an evaluation of the future
chances of integrative employment and structural policies, such as job rotation,
in Germany.
                                           
10 The nine countries are: Denmark, United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland, Austria, France,
Germany, Italy and Portugal.
5Analysis of the courses of different Jobrotation-projects
and identification of the key areasA
Formulation of hypothetical favourable prerequisitesB
Identification of indicators for the favourable prerequisitesC
Evaluation and formulation of resultsD
Figure 1: Sequential procedure method to identify the indicators for the
requirements the success of job rotation. The grouping from A to
C corresponds to the columns A to C in Figure 2.
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73. Institutional and financial framework for job rotation
3.1. Legal framework
The legal framework conditions are very important preconditions for the
development of job rotation projects. They stem directly from the individual
legal systems and are therefore dependent on legal traditions and current laws.
In our context, regulations governing vocational training for the employed and
unemployed, dismissal protection laws and the national legislation regarding
employment promotion are of particular relevance. Due to their sanction
potential, legal regulations have a complementary effect on other incentive
structures and may play a decisive role for the parties involved in job rotation
projects.
A legally anchored right to further training is a favourable framework
condition. If possible, a large number of workers should have access to this
right and it should encompass a longer period thus allowing it to be used for job
rotation training courses. Such rights however must also be flanked by effective
dismissal protection laws so that a worker’s job is not threatened when he/she
is partaking in further training courses. Dismissal protection laws in this case
are primarily to help win workers for further training. They work as an insurance
against the loss of a job during the absence caused by the training.11 On the
other hand, secure dismissal protection laws promote higher company loyalty
which is an important factor making companies willing to invest in their
personnel. In cases of high fluctuation and high unemployment, companies
may attempt to harness skilled workers from the external market and fire their
non-qualified staff. If a company has made an initial investment in further
training it will try to profit as long as possible from its staff’s increased
productivity in order to gain the highest returns possible from the human
resources investment. This again lessens the probability of a company making
lay-offs. (cf.. Mincer 1989, Becker 1964).
Secure dismissal protection can however also lessen staff motivation to
acquire additional skills. If a job is safe, regardless of the workers’
qualifications and productivity, then they are not bound to continue to upgrade
their skills in order to keep their jobs.
                                           
11 We thank our TSER co-operation partner Rachel Silvera for this comment. She notes that in
France, work releases are often used to check the dispensability of staff members.
8The motivation for workers to participate in further training and to bear part
of the costs depends on the types of training on offer. The higher the level of
general skills being offered by the courses, the stronger are their own interests.
When a course offers a higher level of specific skills the workers are less
motivated to make a personal investment in this area.12
Along with these incentive structures, conditions for job rotation could be
very much improved if companies were legally bound to give their staff
continual training.
Favourable for the unemployed would be legislation granting workers a
legal right to further training which would allow all unemployed persons the
opportunity to participate in job rotation projects. This infers the compatibility of
legal regulations for employment promotion with job rotation. A clear-cut
creation of legislation for job rotation in the national legal systems would be of
great advantage. As an assistance, regulations for practice-oriented training for
unemployed could also be used.
In the key area ”legal framework conditions”, a large selection of indicators
could be identified which can be used for a systematic empirical description of
the requirements for successful job rotation. The selected indicators are:
regulations concerning further training for workers, the strength of the
employment laws, the precepts for fixed-term contracts and the laws
concerning active labour market policy (s. Ill.1 and Table. 1: 1.1 to 1.4).
3.2. Financial framework
Along with the legal framework conditions, the financial framework conditions
are probably the most important factors for the success of job rotation. Funding
for the project management, for the training courses and for the evaluation
must be guaranteed as well as the salaries for the trainees and substitutes.
This report shows vast differences in international comparisons (Table 1: 5.2
and EU Job Rotation – The Secretariat 1998), which, through the
corresponding differences in the incentive structures, we assume, greatly
influence the individual participating parties. The financial framework conditions
are closely connected to the motivational conditions (s. 3.5), but are on another
level within our research system. Therefore we differentiate within our analysis
scheme between financial framework conditions and motivational conditions
which also have financial aspects.
                                           
12 General skills
 are beneficial for many other employers and raise the worker’s wage level;
specific skills,
 on the other hand, are beneficial only to the company carrying out the training
(Becker 1964).
9We believe that the structure of the national labour administration or
employment service, as the main source for funding of active labour market
policy, plays an important role for job rotation as an instrument for integrated
structural and labour market policy (cf. Moraal 1998: 14). Job rotation is a
combination of employment and structural policies. The labour market policy
aspect is met by training and job placement for unemployed persons while the
components of the structural aspect are the state-assisted training of workers
and the establishment of regional networks. In many countries these three
policy areas can be assigned to up to three different government ministries
whose separate political objectives and budgets may vary widely. The analysis
of indicators for the financial liability for labour market policy, administrative
responsibility for policy, for the responsibility for company further training and
for funding job rotation projects shows the relation between the administrative
and financial organisational structure and the framework conditions for job
rotation (Ill..1 and Table 1: 2.1, 2.2, 2.6 in appendix and EU Job Rotation – The
Secretariat 1998). Additionally one must investigate as to whether the budget
allocated to active labour market policy and its focuses, which varies widely in
the all the countries, influences the conditions for the success of job rotation.
Based on the indicators for the financial framework conditions, primarily the
conditions for the promotion of job rotation projects as an instrument for active
labour market policy are described. Since a large percentage of funding comes
from the Adapt initiative, we expect that a relation will be seen from the amount
of the national Adapt budget (Tab.1: 2.5) and the number and size of the job
rotation projects in the nine countries being investigated in this study (Tab.1:
6.4). Furthermore, indicators have been selected which give information on the
different possibilities of funding further training and on the already existing job
rotation model projects. This will assist us in showing the most important
features of the funding systems for enterprises, workers and the unemployed.
3.3. Regional networks
The participation of many different parties in job rotation projects calls for an
immense amount of co-ordination. Specialist literature maintains that the
resulting costs can be reduced by establishing and institutionalising regional
networks (Schmid 1996a: 217ff.). Beyond the actual co-ordination output, co-
operative network structures provide employment and structural policy
solutions, job rotation being one of them.
In drawing up the conditions for success in this area we are assuming that
already existing regional networks and co-operative institutions can be utilised
in developing and carrying out job rotation projects. This is only possible in a
co-operative environment with mutual trust and with all parties working
together. If these prerequisites are not fulfilled, or only in a very rudimentary
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fashion, then the co-ordinating agency has substantially more work in planning
and implementing job rotation projects. The proficiency of a co-operative
network is, however, dependent on the autonomy of the individual participants
(cf. Benson 1975). This is why the sovereignty of the regional labour offices of
the employment service, which are important network participants, plays such a
significant role. If their decision-making authority is severely limited then there
will be a smaller repertory of solutions. In order to describe the structure of
regional networks, the indicators showing the organisational structures of the
labour offices and the further training system, along with their network partners,
have therefore been taken into account (Tab.: 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3).
3.4. Companies' structural and economic conditions
The community initiative Adapt, and therefore most of the job rotation model
projects are targeted primarily towards SMEs. These enterprises very often
suffer from the lack of a skilled workforce without being properly aware of this
problem, not to mention having a strategy to overcome these skill deficiencies.
One of the main objectives of job rotation is to make these companies aware of
this problem and to develop suitable training programmes with the SMEs and
other involved parties. However, the degree of the obstacles to implementing
job rotation projects does not only depend on management and the personnel
departments but also on the company’s current economic situation.
Economically viable companies are usually more prepared to invest time
and capital in their human resources as opposed to businesses which are in
economic difficulties. Furthermore the so-called desired ”adherence” effect, i.e.
when the substitute is kept on by the company as a permanent worker,
increases in accordance with higher actual or expected turnover. On the other
hand, the probability of a substitute being kept on is lessened when a company
must in any case decrease its workforce for economic reasons.
Corporate further training activities, the general economic climate and the
average rate of unemployment in the individual countries are the indicators for
the structural and economic conditions for job rotation (Tab. 1: 4.1 to 4.3). The
use of these indicators should assist the comparable empirical study of the
requirements necessary in this key area for the success of projects.
A society which has integrated structural changes and technological
progress in the employment system has a stronger awareness of present and
future challenges in comparison to a system which still adheres to the old
production structures and technology. In this context the indicators for the
general economic climate and further training activities in enterprises also give
indirect information. These indicators are of course only rough guidelines, as
the pace of structural changes can vary widely in the different sectors,
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branches and regions of an economy, with a large discrepancy among the
SMEs.
The structural changes and dynamics of the employment system can work
in two ways for job rotation: on the one hand, the obligation to adapt to new
production and consumer situations increase further training activities, while on
the other hand, competitive pressure and the necessary acclimatisation can
lead to a very difficult economic situation whereby many enterprises may
neglect personnel development.
This also applies to SMEs and staff training. This indicator can also work
both ways for job rotation. On the one hand high activity in the training field
implies that a company is generally open for further training opportunities, while
it can also imply that these needs are already adequately covered by the
company itself. This second probability however is rather unlikely. The
implementation of job rotation projects with companies which, in any case, are
active in the training area may also increase the danger of a so-called
‘deadweight’ effect. This can occur when companies abuse the wide range of
assistance and subventions for job rotation to undertake training schemes
which they could have afforded to carry out without external assistance.
The indicator for the general economic climate (Tab.1: 4.2) can also be
interpreted in two directions: A healthy climate can be advantageous for job
rotation as good turnover forecasts will make investments in new technology
and human resources seem profitable13, on the other hand, full production
capacity may lead to lack of extra resources to plan and carry out job rotation
projects. Decisive factors here are how ‘lean’ the company’s individual
production structures are and the average number of overtime hours.
3.5. Motivational conditions
Job rotation can only be a success if the participants partake on a voluntary
basis. Both the employees and their substitutes must show a high degree of
motivation and willingness to learn. Only a motivated substitute can be
smoothly integrated in the workplace while only a motivated employee will reap
the benefits of a further training course which will in turn increase the
company’s productivity and flexibility. We expect that the participants’ personal
motives for taking part in further training are mainly due to financial incentives
or the hope of immaterial gains. This is why the incentives are closely
interwoven with the financial framework conditions for job rotation.
                                           
13 The close connection between economic growth and employment has been confirmed in a
comprehensive OECD study (1996b).
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The wages for the substitutes and the amount, duration and development
of unemployment benefits have been chosen as indicators. We expect that the
motivation of unemployed persons to participate in job rotation projects
increases in line with the difference between the wage for substitutes and
unemployment benefits. We also expect their motivation to increase if the
duration of unemployment payments is relatively short (cf. OECD 1997b: 51ff.).
One of the non-commercial advantages to participation in job rotation
projects is social status. This can be indirectly associated with the substitute’s
authorised status in the company. If the substitutes are only active as ‘unskilled
part-time help’ they are not likely to be accepted as equal colleagues by other
staff. Regulations which allow for the employment of substitutes with fixed-term
contracts in companies could help raise their working status and thus increase
motivation for potential substitutes.
State promotion of further training can very much increase workers’
incentives to participate in job rotation projects. An idea worth considering in
this context would be a certification standard by which further training would be
awarded with a government-recognised certificate. This would mean that the
new skills acquired could be utilised in other jobs and not solely for the
enterprise participating in job rotation.
An indication of the likelihood of finding enough workers and unemployed
to participate in job rotation schemes is their willingness for life-long learning
(Tab.1: 5.6). Such unemployed persons would be more inclined to take on a
new work area within a project rather then those who are not willing to learn
new skills and are only prepared to take on the same type of work which they
had before unemployment. Willingness for life-long learning is an even more
important influence for workers to take part in further training.
An interesting, though ambivalent, indicator is the worker’s subjective
feeling of job security in the various employment systems (Tab.1: 5.7, cf. also
Chapter 3.5 on pages 8-9). Low job security would probably increase the
worker’s efforts to improve his/her skills in order to secure his/her job or to
improve chances of finding more steadfast employment. On the other hand, the
fear of job loss could also impede a worker’s motivation to learn new skills as
he/she may be afraid that a (temporary) absence could heighten chances of
being laid off.
3.6. Project development
The high degree of complexity in job rotation projects is due to the multiple
elements whose complicated interaction results in much time and trouble
having to be invested in setting up a project. The interests of many different
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parties must be taken into account and many separate projects must be co-
ordinated and synchronised. This calls for a professional project management
body which initiates and co-ordinates all the necessary stages. This task is
taken over by the regional co-ordination agencies for the job rotation model
projects.
In order to master this task professionally and effectively the co-ordination
agencies must have adequate planning capacities, staff and funding. The
project management must be able to work with the other parties involved to
develop and implement good and practical project ideas. Success indicators
here are the task areas and other functions of the co-ordination agencies
(Tab.1: 6.1).
Another important prerequisite for job rotation projects is the development
of suitable training modules for the staff of companies partaking in the projects.
These are often developed in close co-operation with the enterprises
themselves and with business associations and trade unions. This calls for
detailed and concrete information on the current or future qualification
requirements for the individual companies. Analyses of the regional training
requirements – the results of which could be useful for job rotation projects –
were however not carried out in all the European countries involved. Existent
regional surveys on training requirements are therefore very important
indicators within the key area ”Project development” (Tab.1: 6.2).
The political and academic environment also plays an important role in the
realisation of job rotation projects. There is indeed a strong political willingness
on a European level to initiate and implement model projects which forms to an
equal degree the political framework for job rotation in all EU Member States.
However the heterogeneous methods of putting EU initiatives into practice can
lead to varying results. Furthermore the differing administrative and
organisational structures ( centralism, federalism) can also influence the
individual national and regional framework conditions for job rotation.
This also applies to the community initiative Adapt, which according to its
definition is put into practice on the initiative of the Member States (European
Commission: Internet). This involves implementing schemes at grass root level.
Additionally the framework conditions for job rotation projects are also
influenced and decided upon by the actors on the national and regional levels.
This is not only true for concrete legislation but also in relation to administrative
regulations, work instructions and informal decision-making processes.
General and specific support from individual and collective parties on
national, regional and local levels for job rotation projects would be an
advantageous political framework condition. This support could be both in the
form of political decision making as well as on an administrative level. There is
a wide scope of possibilities to support or hinder job rotation. This range
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encompasses from tight or flexible administrative regulations right through to
adapting regional or national laws to the requirements of employment and
structural policy-related schemes such as job rotation.
The academic environment can also have either positive or negative
repercussions for job rotation projects. Here one must mention interaction
between science and the political actors, identified by experts or research
surveys on job rotation projects – this interaction may well influence policy
behaviour. Scientific background information and structural analyses can be
helpful and encouraging when developing concepts and carrying out projects.
Committees with members from political, research and practice-orientated
backgrounds can be of particular advantage as they can use their wide scope
of influence to counter barriers in the planning and implementation of projects.
Unfortunately it is difficult to gather empirical data in this area. Long
interviews would be necessary with the parties involved in the national job
rotation projects and these would then have to be analysed and evaluated from
a network-theoretical standpoint. This undertaking is beyond the scope of this
study so a systematic description of the political and academic support had to
be omitted. Instead, the regional supporting committees with representatives
from business associations, politics, research bodies and from the projects who
identified and discussed job rotation problems at regular intervals were taken
as an indicator (Tab.1: 6.3).
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4. Discussions of the conditions for job rotation in nine
European countries
The conditions leading to the success of job rotation projects are structured in
the third part of this study. The fourth part deals with the analysis for conditions
for projects in the individual national contexts. We shall commence with
Denmark where job rotation has been implemented on a nation-wide scale and
has been developed as an important element for employment and structural
policy. Denmark will thus serve as a contrast foil with which the institutional and
financial regulations in the other countries can be compared and evaluated.
4.1. Denmark
The implementation of job rotation in Denmark can be regarded as successful.
The number of participants taking part in job rotation makes this evident.
Soerensen (1998: 49) reports over 17,800 participants for 1994, over 29,000
for 1995 and over 36,500 for 1996 (cf. Tab.2). The numbers however according
to the European Commission (1997b: 14) are somewhat less, with official
figures for 1995 at 24,340.14 While it is expected that participant numbers will
have decreased for 1997, a strong increase in numbers is planned for 1998
and 1999.15 A comparison between the number of participants in Denmark and
in the other countries (Tab. 1: 6.3) clearly shows that job rotation has been
much further developed here, along only with Sweden. What are the reasons
for this success?
4.1.1. Institutional framework
Active labour market policy is held in high regard in Denmark and the intensity
with which it’s propagated lies just behind that of Sweden in the list of countries
under survey (Tab.1: 2.3). Qualification and training enjoys an immensely high
priority within employment schemes (Tab.1: 2.4). The state plays an excellent
role in further education by providing training centres and centres for adult
education.
                                           
14 The discrepancy between these figures is based on the different definitions for ”job rotation”.
The border between a normal substitution for an absent employee e.g. in Germany for
maternity leave, and a substitution within the job rotation framework is not always clearly
defined.
15 Relevant estimations for Denmark were delivered by Stig Skovbo, AOF Silkeborg.
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The Danish law on work release is an important legal framework condition
allowing the large-scale implementation of job rotation projects. From 1993 to
1994 the number of participants rose by almost a third from approx. 6,700 to
approx. 19,000. According to DTI (European Commission 1997b: 7), this
increase is due mainly to changes in the employment laws which came into
force at the beginning of 1994 encouraging work leave. These law reforms
concerned three areas: firstly, the a much wider section of the workforce were
given a right to study leave, secondly pay during leave was increased to 100%
of unemployment benefits and thirdly a direct substitution for the worker on
educational leave was no longer compulsory (Nätti 1997, Höcker/Reissert
1995). It is interesting to note here that, according to the statistics on hand, this
voluntary basis did not lead to a decrease of unemployed substitutes but on the
contrary, figures increased from approx. 1,000 to approx. 5,000 (Tab.2).
This could be due to two factors. In broadening the rights to educational
leave with corresponding better payment benefits, a distinct incentive was
established leading to an increase in the number of employees availing of
study leave from approx. 12,000 to approx. 80,000 between 1993 and 1996.16
Secondly, job rotation has been intensively implemented nation-wide since
1994. To help achieve this, intensive public awareness campaigns were carried
out to make the new opportunities for leave-taking better known.
The fact that there is a lesser number of substitutes in comparison to
employed workers participating in job rotation projects in Denmark is an
indicator that on average several workers are replaced by a single substitute
and that therefore the average replacement period by the substitute is of longer
duration than the worker’s study leave.17
Tab.2:
 Job rotation and further training: Number of participants and total
number of employees on leave in Denmark.
1993 1994 1995
Employed JR Participants 3.680 12.200 21.015
Unemployed JR Participants 1.042 5.600 7.988
Total JR Participants 4.722 17.800 29.003
Total of leave for training 2.400 47.000 80.000
Ratio of employed JR
participants to total of leave
for training 3:2 1:4 1:4
Sources: Nätti and AOF Silkeborg, own calculations.
Joint statutory and union regulations allow workers to avail of regular leave for
further training for up to 1 year duration (unemployed persons: 2 years) (s.
                                           
16 However during the same period the utilisation of family leave and sabbaticals decreased
perceptibly. Thus the total figures for persons on leave through these three programmes fell
from 140,000 in 1994 to 132,000 in 1995.
17 This observation has also been confirmed for job rotation projects in other European
countries Uhrig (1998: 37). The Berlin model projects, where a single substitute replaces an
employee on training are to be seen more as an exception.
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Tab.1, 1.1). Corresponding employment legislation (UTB/ATB Laws) enables
unemployed persons to participate in further training which includes a practical
work period. This ”employment offer” is available as an individual activation
plan to people who have been unemployed for (according to which risk group
they belong) between six months and two years. The combination of both of
these sets of regulations played an important role in the implementation of job
rotation projects, especially during the initial period (Soerensen 1998: 43).
Settlements for leave of absence for employees in Denmark have been
accompanied by corresponding funding arrangements. Both funding for
companies partaking in further training (Tab.1: 2.6), and funding for the
individual participants can be described as comparably generous. Educational
leave is specially designed for the introduction of job rotation (European
Commission, BIR Denmark 1997: 38). Payment is in line with 100% of the
maximum amount of unemployment assistance (Tab.1: 5.3 and 5.5). Loss of
income during a longer period of study leave is relatively low for members of
the lower and middle wage brackets as compensatory payments are 90% of the
last gross wages.18 This circumstance could explain an interesting phenomenon
in the participant statistics: Even though empirical studies (Audier/Giraud 1996,
Schömann/Becker 1994, Tuijnman/Schömann 1996) show, that companies are
in general more interested in training their better educated employees19 and
that this group is more interested in further training, (Eurobarometer 44.0), the
proportion of lesser skilled workers is higher (European Commission 1997b:
15f). The companies could be compelled to subsidise income loss for their
highly qualified employees while on educational leave which would only add to
the high production losses incurred during the absence of such a well-
integrated highly productive colleague.
A further explanation for the above-average participation of lesser-skilled
participation in job rotation projects would be the difficulty in finding suitably
qualified substitutes in Denmark. This shortage would then mean that fewer
projects could be tailored to highly-skilled participants.
The structure of the trade unions offers a further explanation for high rate
of participation of lower-skilled workers. Since union membership is designated
according to occupational groups and not according to sectors, a strong lobby
for the non-skilled and low-skilled workers can sway a lot of influence for their
particular demands. Furthermore the trade unions’ responsibility for the
unemployment insurance funds means that their members still remain closely
associated with the unions even after job loss.
                                           
18 In general, unemployment benefit rates in Denmark are 90% of the last gross salary
(Schmid/Reissert 1994: 239). However, the level for net unemployment benefits for 1994 was
set much lower by the OECD (1996). The relatively low maximum benefit which reduces an
average earner’s unemployment benefits to well below 90% of the last gross wage could help
explain the difference.
19 This can be very clearly observed in France (European Commission, BIR France 1996).
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4.1.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
Job rotation’s success in Denmark is remarkable in regard to its extent and the
results for labour market policy. The longer replacement duration of substitutes
in enterprises had possibly a positive influence on the number kept on as
permanent employees. 60-80% of the substitutes were kept on in many regions
of Denmark (European Commission 1997b: 1) which is a great success factor
for an labour market policy measure. Both the offers for further training along
with their financial framework conditions act as strong incentives for
companies and individuals to avail of these opportunities. This is obvious due
to the high number of enterprises training their workforces (Tab.1: 4.1), as well
as the Danish people’s extremely positive attitude to life-long learning (Tab.1:
5.6).
The number of substitutes in 1995 was only approx. 4% of the total number
of unemployed in Denmark (AOF 1998 and OECD 1997e). Job rotation
however becomes more significant when the substitute figures are compared to
the difference in the total unemployment statistics between 1994 and 1995: In
1995 the total unemployment figures dropped by approx. 25,000 compared to
the previous year. 16% (approx. 4.000 persons) of this reduction can be seen
as a direct result of job rotation20, when using the premise that on average 70%
of the substitutes are taken over and when disregarding other fluctuation
factors.
The percentage of unemployed who are participating, within the framework
of ”employment offers”21 in job rotation projects is between 5 and 10%.22 These
figures show that the general effects of job rotation on the long-term
unemployment rate 23 in Denmark are relatively low: when 70% of the
substitutions are taken on permanently after the replacement period, the
percentage of long-term unemployed obtaining regular jobs is between 2 and
5% of the total number of long-term unemployed persons, whereby this
percentage is not checked for substitution effects. On the assumption that a
new job could be created anyway for half the substitution posts, which would be
filled by an unemployed person under different circumstances, the percentage
of new jobs for long-term unemployed created through job rotation would be
reduced to between 1 and 2.5%.
                                           
20 This very simple model calculations based on the premises of very advantageous
circumstances and ignores some important factors.
21 After a period of between 6 months to 2 years an unemployed person must be offered a job
or training – here job rotation is very suitable. The length of the unemployment period before
this must be offered depends on his/her placement chances. This scheme is to protect target
groups who are difficult to place from long phases of unemployment.
22 Cf. Soerensen (1998: 49) and European Commission (1997b: 14).
23 Here all unemployed persons with a job offer (see Footnote 22) are classified as being long-
term unemployed.
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The relation between the number of participants in job rotation to the total
number of short and long-term unemployed shows that job rotation can indeed
have a significant effect on reducing unemployment. However, at least in the
form implemented in Denmark, it is less suitable as an instrument to counter
long-term unemployment.
On examining Danish dismissal protection laws (Tab.1: 1.2), which are
however flanked by high and long on-going benefits, one can observe that
strong further training activities on the part of enterprises, a high willingness to
participate on the part of workers and unemployed and weak dismissal
protection laws are not necessary contradictory. Despite the weak dismissal
protection laws, the subjective job security consciousness in Denmark is higher
than in all other countries being surveyed. This can be accounted for by the
strongly growing economy and the decreasing unemployment rates.
4.2. Finland
4.2.1. Institutional framework
The legal framework conditions which can be related to Adapt Job Rotation
were adopted in Finland in 1995. The foundation for these is the leave of
absence legislation which furnishes far-reaching legal conditions similar to
Denmark. After a certain continuous working period, workers have a right to up
to a year’s leave of absence (Nätti 1997). In contrast to Denmark however, this
period can be freely utilised and the employer is compelled to replace him/her
with an unemployed substitute for this period (Tab.1: 1.1). Distinct regulations
for vocational training for the unemployed are anchored in the employment
promotion laws. Furthermore, the opportunity of utilising job rotation projects
has been explicitly adopted by the legislation (Tab.1: 1.4).
Although the percentage of Finland’s budget for active labour market policy
is a high proportion of the gross domestic product (GDP), the intensity of
expenditure is very weak due to the high unemployment rate. The main
emphasis of the labour market policy in on training schemes (Tab.1: 2.3, 2.4).
Further training in enterprises is, as in Denmark, co-funded by the state.
This responsibility does not lie completely with the enterprises – a factor which
makes job rotation projects easier to implement. Furthermore the social
partners, whose structures and networks could be used for job rotation projects,
also have funds for further training (Tab.1: 2.6).
The tripartite and yet decentralised structure of the labour administration is
of advantage to job rotation’s labour market policy and social policy functions.
Trade union representation on all important committees is also a warrant for the
20
even-handed implementation of job rotation (Tab.1: 2.6). The desired
”adherence” effect of the substitutes is relatively strong thanks to Finland’s
particularly good economy which lends itself to expansion potential (Tab.1:
4.4).
4.2.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
The incentives for employees are relatively weak. Payments would have to
increased in order to be able to utilise the opportunities for leave of absence in
Finland for job rotation. The low financial compensation (Tab.1: 5.3) has proved
to be the main deterrent to avail of leave of absence. 73% of the workers who
took leave were female which indicates that the opportunity is often availed of
for maternity leave. The average length of absence was 8.5 months (Nätti
1997).
The projects established through the Adapt Job Rotation initiative also
seemed to offer little incentive for the substitutes. They were normally not
taken on the staff roll but continued to have unemployed status (either during
job experience or in the form of further training). Additionally their remuneration
is low in comparison to a worker’s wage (Tab.1: 5.1, 5.2).
The low incentives could however be counterbalanced by the high
unemployment rate, the medium wages level and the above-average
willingness of the unemployed for life-long learning (Tab.1: 5.4, 5.5, 5.6).
For enterprises, participation in job rotation projects, is in contrast,
worthwhile as, according to our calculation model, they do not have to bear any
part of the active costs.
Despite the inadequately developed incentive structures, the indicators
available justify the classification of Finland’s institutional structures as being
suitable for employment and structural policies such as job rotation. The legal
framework conditions on the level of reimbursement payments however, must
be adapted. The fact that legal regulations specifically suitable to job rotation
already exist is a positive factor. The promising start of the ”Act on Job
alternation” (Työvuorottelutoimikunnan väliraportti) project can be evaluated as
a sign of positive conditions for job rotation. Further surveys on the possibilities
of combining ”Job alternation leave” with job rotation must be carried out
however before reaching a final conclusion.
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4.3. Sweden
Experience with substitution models has been gathered in Sweden since 1987
which led to the introduction of ‘further training substitution’
(Utbildningsvikariat) in 1991. This has since been developed into a nation-wide
policy instrument and led to placements of approx. 42,000 substitutes in 1994/5
(Olsson 1997).
4.3.1. Institutional framework
Far-reaching laws dealing with leave of absence for further training exist in
Sweden as in the other Scandinavian countries. Additionally since 1996 the
Swedish employment promotion legislation has laws dealing particularly with
substitutions (Tab.1: 1.1 and 1.4).
The percentage of 2,25% of the GDP for active labour market policy is
high, exceeded only by Denmark. The intensity of this policy is clearly at the
top of the countries surveyed (Tab.1: 2.3).
Leave of absence is especially encouraged by the Swedish labour
administration when it can deter lay-offs. About DM 12,600 (ECU 6,350) is
available per worker (Tab.1: 2.6) but only if the employer guarantees that no
lay-offs shall occur for the duration of the project (Olsson 1997). This offer for
further training is combined with the labour office offer to fill the free work
places with unemployed substitutes. Despite this rather contradictory
arrangement24 , according to Lindbeck (1995), 7,600 unemployed substitutes
could be integrated in courses in autumn 1994.
In contrast to Denmark, the most use for the substitute method has been
found in the public administration sector. It is mainly the regional
administrations (regional parliaments) and municipalities which successfully
utilise this scheme in the health and care sector. The restructuring of the
regional parliaments brought an added inducement to apply the further training
substitution method (Lindbeck 1995).
The decentralised organisational structure of the Swedish labour
administration is probably advantageous to the implementation of the
substitution models. Its tripartite structure is beneficial in achieving social policy
targets and in finding agreement with the social partners (Tab. 1: 3.1).
As is the case in Finland, the relationship between the ‘Swedish version’ of
the substitution model with Adapt Job Rotation is not fully clear. A combination
                                           
24 If funding is only paid for training for workers whose jobs are in danger the company will not
have any great interest in filling these surplus workplaces with unemployed persons.
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of both instruments could of course be taken into consideration. On the other
hand the Swedish ‘Further training offer’ focuses more strongly on directly
endangered jobs as is usually the case in Adapt projects. Which of these
possibilities is relevant could not, unfortunately be clarified.
According to information from LAA Örebro, 1,414 persons (workers plus
substitutes) partook in job rotation projects. This is an immense difference in
comparison to the other countries and is probably due to the participation of
larger firms in the projects.
4.3.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
The incentives for unemployed to participate in job rotation seem especially
strong in Sweden. According to the model calculation, 96% of normal wages
are paid and the substitutes receive a fixed-term contract with the enterprises.
Furthermore the 35% difference to the unemployment benefits is completely
sufficient and is the third highest in the countries surveyed, behind the United
Kingdom and Austria (Tab.1: 5.1 to 5.3).
The willingness towards life-long learning is somewhat less prevalent
among Swedish employees as is among their Danish and Finnish colleagues.
In Sweden 79% of the workers accept the principle of the necessity for life-long
learning while in Finland the figure is 81% and in Denmark 93% (Tab.1: 5.6).
The worker’s subjective feeling of job security is also less than in Denmark and
Finland even though Swedish employment protection laws are stronger than
those of the other two countries (Tab.1: 1.2). As a lower level on this indicator
can also signalise higher willingness for further training, this would be a
positive influence for job rotation, at least when the courses consisted of a
certain ratio of general skills (s. Chapter 3, 3.1 and 3.5, P. 8,9 and 13).
The enterprise funding share for job rotation projects is, according to the
model calculation, the highest of all the surveyed countries. This could pose a
problem for implementing projects.
The framework conditions for job rotation can be described as positive.
This assessment is supported by the current participant figures.
4.4. France
The job rotation model projects in France are the most recent in the European
partner countries. Although projects were being planned in 1996, actual
implementation with Adapt approval only began in 1998. Apart from the Adapt
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initiative, no other job alteration methods have been developed in France
comparable to those in Denmark and Finland.
The study of the framework conditions for the concrete application can
therefore only refer to the very few reports available on project experience and
is to be regarded as provisional.
4.4.1. Institutional framework
The French further training system for employees is well-developed. It is based
on an obligatory levy from the enterprises. These must invest 1.5% of their
gross wage bill in training and further training whereby the lion’s share is
invested in in-company training (Tab.1: 2.6). This system offers an explanation
for the high involvement of French enterprises in further training. This
involvement is however not uniform in all enterprises: smaller companies offer
far less training than firms with over 250 employees (Tab.1: 4.1). It has also
been observed that it is mainly the higher-skilled workers who get the
opportunity to participate in further training courses (Audier/Giraud 1996). Both
of these observations point to unequal opportunities as a result of this allotment
structure and is contradictory to social policy objectives. Job rotation could, in
this situation, help lessen these inequalities: further training in SMEs could be
encouraged with a special focus on helping lower-skilled workers.
The chances of developing job rotation projects in France depend on
certain unknown factors. If it were possible to utilise funds invested in
enterprise training then the funding for employees in job rotation projects would
be secured. Additionally a considerable amount of the EU’s Adapt budget has
been reserved for France (Tab. 1: 2.5). Since active labour market policy has a
great significance in France (Tab. 1: 2.3, 2.4) and many programmes for the
unemployed exist, there should not be any great hurdles for job rotation
projects to be expected in the area of the financial and legal framework
conditions.
However the fragmentation of the labour administration could lead to
problems for job rotation. Questions regarding areas of responsibility, sector
and branch-related peculiarities and the split unions make the assessment of
job rotation’s chances uncertain (Tab.1: 2.2, 3.1). There is not sufficient data
available for an exact prognosis on the development of the framework
conditions. This is because the Adapt projects are still in an early stage.
A number of indicators among the motivational factors indicate positive
conditions for job rotation. Workers and unemployed have a positive attitude
towards life-long learning, the unemployment rate is well above the European
average and wages for substitutes, at least according to our calculation model,
are considerably more than unemployment benefits (Tab.1: 5.2, 5.6, 4.4). The
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about average French dismissal protection laws (Tab.1: 1.2 and 5.7) could
pose a problem for the incentives for workers to undergo further training to
acquire special skills. This, combined with the clear sense of job insecurity
prevalent in France (Tab.1: 1.2 and 5.7), could result in workers rejecting a
longer leave of absence for training for fear of losing their jobs in their absence
due to economic reasons.
4.4.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
A combination of all recognisable framework conditions for the implementation
of job rotation schemes signalises a positive incentive structure for
enterprises. According to the model calculation, no extra costs for participation
in projects would be incurred which would not already be covered by the
normal contributions to the further training funds.
One shall have to see as to what extent the weak dismissal protection laws
will be a positive or negative incentive factor for employees (cf. Chapter 3, 3.1
and 3.6). An evaluation of the incentive structure for the unemployed is
currently not possible because the most important indicators for the legal status
and wages of substitutes in enterprises are still unclear.
An overall assessment of the financial and institutional conditions for job
rotation in France has therefore somewhat conflicting results. All estimations
have a high uncertainty factor due to the high level of fragmentation in the
French employment system. The chances for job rotation are lesser in
comparison to the north-European countries as the most important constituent
of a positive legal and financial structure, namely the existence of regulations
for long-term leave of absence for further training, is less prevalent than in
Denmark or Finland. Nevertheless it is possible that the existing rules for
individual study leave and the pledges for further training are sufficient for a
dynamic development of job rotation projects.
4.5. United Kingdom
4.5.1. Institutional framework
Against its background of a liberal legal tradition, The United Kingdom does not
have any general binding laws regarding leave of absence for workers. Up to
now, the government has focused on incentives for companies and individuals
to help raise the level of further training activities. Further agreements may
then be negotiated individually or with the union partners. Correspondingly, the
labour laws are less adjusted and have no restrictions for fixed-term and a low
level of dismissal protection (Tab.1: 1.1, 1.2, 1.3). On the other hand, the laws
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for employment promotion contain elements of the combination of training and
work experience which could be utilised for job rotation (Tab.1: 1.4).
Funding for active labour market policy is low in the United Kingdom. Both
as a percentage of the GDP and the strength of spending are five to six times
below that of the better equipped countries (Tab.1: 2.3). Accordingly the
priorities for active labour market policy lie within the labour administration’s
classical core tasks: the lion’s share of funding is made available for the
placement of the unemployed (Tab.1: 2.4)25. The United Kingdom, however,
receives a large sum from the Adapt budget – the total amount being the
highest of all the countries in this survey (Tab.1: 2.5).
The fact that the organisational structure of the employment service and
labour market policy is geared towards enterprise needs and the creation of
privately-run TECs (Training and Enterprise Councils) to the disadvantage of
tripartite administrative structures is in sharp contrast to the situation already
described in Denmark, Finland and Sweden as well as in France. TECs are
organisations which receive contracts via public tender from the authorities to
perform public tasks. After a certain period the TECs must reapply for these
contracts. The objective is to make these public services as economically
viable as possible. The question here is to what an extent this principle may
hinder demanding and, in the planning and implementation of projects,
complicated, long-lasting forms of labour market policy such as job rotation. If
TEC activities are to be evaluated on a narrow benefit – cost analysis whereby
the ”quick success” counts, then it would be difficult to organise job rotation
projects with them. In the light of this institutional structure, it seems important
that the influential British employers should be convinced of the benefits of job
rotation projects so that the Industrial Training Boards, the TECs and
Employers Associations would be willing to co-operate on projects. Only so can
one imagine a nation-wide implementation of job rotation in the United
Kingdom.
The structural and economic conditions for enterprises seem
advantageous for this. British enterprises are extremely active in further
training in comparison to the other countries. In companies with over 250
employees the United Kingdom tops the scale ahead of France with a rate of
48% while for SMEs it follows Denmark in second place (Tab.1: 4.1).
Furthermore, the economic situation, which gives pointers to the likelihood of
enterprises making growth investments, looks relatively healthy even though
economic growth in 1998 and 1999 is significantly weaker than in 1997 (Tab.1:
4.4). The indicators among the incentive factors can also be seen as positive.
The substitutes are employed by companies with wages well exceeding
unemployment benefits, dole payments are extremely low and the British are
                                           
25
 Both qualitative and quantitative changes can be expected from the objectives set by the
United Kingdom’s new government. The budget for active labour market policy is to be
increased and the training of workers is to be designated as one of the most important aims.
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second to the Danes in their positive attitude to life-long learning (Tab.1: 5.1 to
5.6).
4.5.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
The incentives for employees to participate in further training schemes such as
job rotation are strengthened by the compulsion for continually improving one’s
own skills – this is due to low job security caused by weak employment
protection laws.
The incentives for enterprises are no doubt dependant on whether
participation in job rotation projects decreases or raises the costs for giving
their employees further training.
The incentives for the unemployed to participate in job rotation projects
are strong. According to our model calculations, substitutes’ wages are on par
with those of regular employees and much higher than average unemployment
payments.
The estimation of the chances for a nation-wide implementation of job
rotation projects in Britain is also somewhat contradictory. The main uncertainty
factor is the TECs’ reaction and suitability. Their suitability for active co-
operation in a job rotation network is difficult to gauge. Their co-operation,
however, is of vital importance because of the central role they play in
implementing active labour market policy in the United Kingdom.
4.6. Italy
4.6.1. Institutional framework
A legislative reform encompassing leave of absence for employees and grants
for further training is being planned in Italy where previously no general
regulations existed for training for workers. Regulations already exist for fixed-
term employment of staff as well as rights for the unemployed to participate in
training courses and practical training (Tab.1: 1.1 to 1.4) – these can be utilised
within the job rotation framework.
Italy takes third last place in front of the United Kingdom and Austria in its
spending for active labour market policy measured as a percentage of the
GDP. This ranking is improved when the strength of spending is observed: here
Italy takes fourth place together with Portugal. The main focus of the active
labour market policy is, due to the high rate of youth unemployment, on
assistance and schemes for the youth and for jobless young persons. These
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measures offer a variety of vocational training programmes. Most of the funding
comes from the government with EU subsidies also as an important source,
especially for the more underdeveloped regions (Tab.1: 2.1 to 2.6). The
importance of the European contributions for Adapt job rotation projects is
obvious from our model calculation: as in Finland and the United Kingdom, the
calculation model is based on the high funding share from EU resources (EU-
Job rotation – the secretariat 1998).26
The organisation structure of the labour administration could have a
detrimental effect on the development of nation-wide job rotation projects in
Italy. It is a centrally organised, yet horizontally fragmented structure with a
strong regulated focus on job placement.27 There is a large number of boards
and management committees with tripartite structures.
Several steps have been taken recently to decentralise the labour
administration with the aim of giving more policy responsibility to the individual
regions (Tab.1: 3.1).
In 1993 further training activities in Italian enterprises were, on average,
less than in Portugal and the lowest of all surveyed countries (Tab.1: 4.1). This
is a clear indicator for Italy’s huge structural problems in this area. Despite this
situation, Italy’s economic barometer (Tab.1: 4.4) is similar to that of the other
countries so that one may speak of good conditions for job rotation-induced
further training and a positive prognosis of companies undertaking expansion
investments.
Willingness for life-long learning is high among the unemployed. They
have a mid-range position when compared with the other countries and the
same can be said of Italian employees. These figures are in stark contrast to
the other sections of the population with 66% having a positive attitude – thus
taking the third last place ahead of Austria and Germany (Tab.1: 5.6).
4.6.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
The framework conditions as far as the motivational factors are concerned may
be described as relatively poor. The substitutes do not have a contract with
the employer and their wage level is, according to the model calculation (Tab.
1: 5.2) only 40% of that of the regular employees and a mere 6% more than
                                           
26 The study of the financing models, however, has shown that the assessment of the cost
sharing is to be viewed with scepticism. In southern Italy a co-funding from the EU to the
given extent (EU-Job Rotation – the secretariat 1998) is quite improbable and would be in
contradiction to the principle of ”Supplementation” (European Commission 1996a: 23).
27 In Italy enterprises are legally bound to give the employment administration notice of
vacancies. Only registered unemployed persons may be taken on. Changes are occurring
however in this area and legislation has been introduced, opening the market for temporary
employment agencies.
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average unemployment benefits. Unemployment benefits are, however, so low
in Italy (Tab.1: 5.4) that an incentive to participation in job rotation projects may
be expected –alone due to the dire straits of the unemployed.
Positive incentives for employees and employers remain low as long as
there are no regulations for leave of absence for further training.
In view of the institutional changes being planned or already initiated in
Italy, one may be curious as to the future developments in active labour market
policy. The status quo is probably only to a certain limit suitable for a nation-
wide implementation of job rotation. This appraisal is confirmed by the lack of
effective study leave regulations, the low compensatory wage level which is a
decisive factor for substitutions in northern Europe, the rigid rules governing
fixed-term contracts and job placement.
4.7. Portugal
4.7.1. Institutional framework
The right of the individual to vocational training is anchored in the Portuguese
constitution. Due to the high rate of youth unemployment, the main focus of the
employment and training regulations is geared towards this target group. This
focal point is mirrored in the funding for the various fields of active labour
market policy (Tab.1: 1.1, 1.4). It comes as a surprise that the Adapt budget for
Portugal is relatively modest when compared to that of the other countries. Its
volume is, on par with Sweden’s, the lowest – however with a 72% co-funding
share from the EU (Tab.1: 2.5)28.
The state-run institute for training and employment (IEFP) plays a central
role in the Portuguese vocational training and further training system. It runs
active labour market policy programmes and its ”Protocol Centres” form a
significant part of the further training infrastructure (Tab.1: 2.2, 2.6, 3.1, 3.2).
The IEFP is administered in a tripartite form and plays a central role in current
and future job rotation projects.
Further training activities in Portuguese enterprises are underdeveloped
(Tab.1: 4.1). In the SME sector, Portugal lies in second last place in front of
Italy while taking last place in the area of larger enterprises. Despite these low
results, the willingness towards life-long learning is surprisingly high, especially
among the unemployed. The rate in Portugal is 84%, surpassed only by the
British and Danish unemployed.
                                           
28 See footnote 26.
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Subjective job security in Portugal is low despite the healthy economic
climate and the relatively low unemployment rate (Tab.1: 4.3, 4.4, 5.7). This
could increase workers’ incentives to participate in further training in order to
improve their chances on the internal and external labour markets (cf.
Sengenberger 1987).
4.7.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
The incentive for the unemployed to participate in job rotation projects in
Portugal does not seem very high. Substitutes do not receive contractual
employment and the 16% difference between the compensatory wages and
unemployment benefits is in the mid-range of the survey countries. The
unemployment rate of 6.6% in Portugal is relatively low so one must expect a
shortage of motivated substitutes.
When participating in job rotation further training schemes workers do not
lose their status as employees and can profit from increased productivity and
corresponding salary increases. This proves that their incentives are positive,
at least when the training encompasses a wider selection of general skills.
According to our model calculation, the incentive for Portuguese
enterprises for participating in job rotation projects is high (EU-Job Rotation –
The Secretariat 1998). The employer must only bear the costs of a possible
loss in productivity caused by the use of a replacement worker. This loss
however is merely short term and is compensated through the productivity gain
from employees’ improved skills, implying that participation will bring a clear
profit.
A detailed evaluation of the chances for a future nation-wide
implementation of job rotation involves a certain degree of uncertainty due to
the data available. The chances for job rotation in Portugal can be gauged as
cautiously optimistic due to a) the strong position of the government in the
institutional structure of the further training system, b) the reliance of the
Portuguese economy on a rapid modernisation in order to increase
competitiveness and c) the general positive attitude towards life-long learning.
The most recent legislation draft for the explicit promotion of job rotation
schemes undoubtedly mirrors a great political enthusiasm. As to whether these
new regulations will actually promote a nation-wide implementation remains to
be seen.
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4.8. Austria
4.8.1. Institutional framework
A new law for leave of absence for educational purposes has been passed in
Austria. At a first glance these new regulations offer an extensive legal
foundation for job rotation: workers have a right to a 6-12 month sabbatical
after a constant three year term of employment and this is financed through
unemployment insurance (Tab. 1: 1.1). However the singularities of this law are
such that it cannot be utilised for job rotation projects: 29: A minimum of 6
months leave is too much for most company managers and the financial losses
for the employees are so large (a standard monthly rate of ECU 400 is paid for
leave duration) that most of them cannot afford to undertake further training
under these conditions.
Austria has a centralised integrated employment service which is
responsible for passive and active labour market policy programmes and
services (Tab.1: 2.2, 3.1). This situation raises the question as to whether the
responsibility labour market policy lying in a single organisation and the
resulting minimised interweaving of budget administration could have a positive
effect on the development of integrated co-operative forms of labour market
policy such as job rotation. The labour administration is controlled on all levels
by committees made up of various parties which are also responsible for
drawing up labour market policy objectives. These co-operative structures are
also mirrored in the Austrian further training system (Tab.1: 3.2).
The assumption that the integrated structure of the employment service
would lead to an increased activation of labour market policy cannot be
confirmed through the Austrian archetype. Funding for active labour market
policy is only 0.38% of the GDP which corresponds to a spending intensity of
0.06. This is extremely low in comparison to the other countries, with the
exception of the United Kingdom (Tab.1: 2.3). As in the United Kingdom,
Austrian labour market policy focuses primarily on job placement for the
unemployed. This is followed however by training for the unemployed and not
by special programmes targeted towards youth unemployment (Tab.1: 2.4).
This difference is certainly due to the differing problem areas in both countries:
thanks to the dual apprentice system, Austria has, in comparison to most of the
other countries, no problems with youth unemployment.
The passivity of the Austrian employment service in regard to its structure
of objectives is possibly due to the extremely low unemployment rate in
comparison to the other countries . It was 4.5% in May 1998, together with
Denmark (4.7%) the best results of all countries surveyed (Tab.1: 4.4).
                                           
29 We would like to thank the expert for job rotation from ÖSB who gave us valuable
information on the practicalities of the new legislation during one of our conferences.
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Another unusual result is the attitude of the Austrians to life-long learning.
Both workers and the unemployed have little interest (Tab.1: 5.6) – this could
be due to the thorough original training offered by the dual system.
4.8.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
The incentive for unemployed to participate in job rotation projects as
substitutes is quite high in Austria. The substitutes receive a fixed-term contract
from the company and their wages are significantly higher than the average
unemployment benefits (Tab.1: 5.1, 5.2).
The incentive for employees to begin a course in further training with the
help of the newly introduced regulations is to be seen as still too low. Although
the possibility of being able to take a longer leave of absence may be judged
as positive, the payment of 400 ECU is as a rule too much of a wage loss and
cannot be seen as a positive motivational factor for employees.
The costs for job rotation projects are divided among the various actors in
line with a co-operative social partner-structure of the Austrian employment
system. Austria does not receive a strong European funding subsidy as do
Italy, Finland or the United Kingdom. The enterprises bear 13% of the costs, a
rate surpassed only in Sweden and the United Kingdom. This burden could
possibly have negative results for support from enterprises for job rotation.
Furthermore, the new and, from the point of view of time, inflexible new
regulations lower still further the motivation for enterprises to take part in job
rotation.
While an attempt has been made in Austria to create institutional and
financial framework conditions for equal job opportunities for all, the new
regulations must be thoroughly improved in order to facilitate a nation-wide
implementation of job rotation. This primarily applies to the flexibility of leave
duration and the financial incentives for the released workers. The co-operative
structures of the employment system, on the other hand, signalise a positive
prognosis for job rotation projects, so that one may venture an overall positive
forecast.
4.9. Germany
The first job rotation projects were begun in 1996 in Germany. The project
organiser, SPI in Berlin, was contracted to test the possibilities for a nation-
wide implementation of job rotation as well as implementing the actual projects
on a pilot basis.
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4.9.1. Institutional framework
The traditionally strong division in German labour market policy between
general initial training and further training in enterprises is one of the most
important institutional framework conditions for the implementation of job
rotation projects. In contrast to other European countries, the objectives of
government training policy are strongly separated from the interests of the
enterprises (Tab. 1: 2.6). The employment promotion law reform has, due to its
content matter and as a result of political strategy, lessened this division
somewhat. But the labour market policy structure is, up to now, not well geared
to applying job rotation as an instrument providing an interface between labour
market policy and structural policy. The consequences of this institutional
structure can be seen in the implementation of further training for employees
and the utilisation of substitutes.
There is no uniform national law for educational leave in Germany. Ten
federal states30 have laws giving employees the right to ten days study leave
every two years (Tab. 1: 1.1). These laws stem from the German tradition
towards adult education and are designed to allow workers general access to
also a very general form of further education. Educational leave is normally not
availed of for concrete further training and in many small companies the
employees are often not allowed to take this leave. All in all, a total of only 2%
of all employees avail of this right (cf. Moraal 1998).
Further training activities in enterprises are well behind the other big
European countries (Tab.1: 4.1). The structural features, especially of the
SMEs result in an inadequate strategic utilisation of further training to help
increase competitiveness.
Quite a large sum is allocated by the government for the further training for
workers and unemployed (Tab.1: 2.3; 2.4). In 1995 approx. 17,1 billion DM ,
almost 50% of the total funds for active labour market policy, was spent on
vocational training schemes (a high sum in international comparison) (cf.
Schmid 1998). However employees must fulfil strict conditions in order to avail
of these schemes – they may only participate in further training courses when
”there is a threat of unemployment or when training is necessary due to a lack
of a recognised qualification” (§77 Abs. 1 SGBIII). ”Employees may not be
supported when the results of the training are in the interests of the company
where they are employed”. This means that in structural policy terms, a future-
orientated training is not only not planned but is explicitly excluded from
promotion. As a result of these laws as well as the dual vocational training
system, one can interpret the willingness of workers and unemployed towards
                                           
30 In the new Laender, laws governing educational leave have been passed only in Brandenburg
and Sachsen-Anhalt. The old Laender with study laws are Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen,
Lower Saxony, North Rhine Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinat and Schleswig-Holstein.
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life-long learning as being very low – 64% of the former and 55% of the latter
have a positive attitude – low in comparison to the other countries (Tab.1: 5.6).
For the implementation of job rotation these legal framework conditions
mean that with EU support these national regulations are more or less passed
by. Adapt or Objective 1 to 4 funding is usually used for this purpose. The
national ADAPT budget of 1,068 Mill. DM is high and 47,6% of this comes from
EU funding (Tab.1: 2.5). This co-funding sum is calculated taking into account
that Germany comprises of both Target 1 regions and non-Target 1 regions.
The Target 1 regions (these include all the new Laender)are supported with a
65% share from EU funds while other areas receive 42%.
The legal regulations and the funding of the substitutes describe the
second effect of the strong division of responsibility for general skills training
and company-specific training – this division is traditional in Germany. The
substitutions are usually organised through programmes run by the Federal
Employment Service and they are given a period of practical work experience
in an enterprise for the duration of the substitution. (Tab. 1: 1.4). The
combination of the German contribution payments with the centralisation of
decision-making responsibility at the Federal Employment Service results in the
problem of making adequate active labour market policy funds available which
are in an anticyclical relationship to the current business cycle. However, these
decision-making structures are being partially decentralised through the SBG
III amendment which allots ‘experiment budgets’ to the local employment
services (Tab.1: 3.1).
In principle, §89 SGBIII (Practical training) has greatly improved the legal
foundation for the utilisation of substitutes in enterprises in comparison to the
AFG (Employment Promotion Law) regulations. A period of company training in
programmes run by the Federal Labour Office was however possible under the
AFG laws if ”the course is completed with an examination of the type laid down
in §46 of the Vocational Education Law or in §§42 or 45 of the Trades and
Crafts Rules or if not less than one quarter of the curriculum encompasses
theory” (§41 Abs. 2a AFG). Experience has shown however that this regulation
is not concrete enough to include the possibility of substitutions so the
discretionary powers of the local labour offices and the necessary amount of
co-ordination were high. §89 formulates periods of practical training ”which
serve to promote further training in a workplace which is temporarily vacated
due to the usual employee’s leave of absence for further education...” (§89
Abs. 1 SGB III).
However despite this clear improvement of the legal framework conditions,
there still remain serious difficulties for the implementation of job rotation. For
example unemployed persons normally have a right to avail of a labour office-
run course only once every two years. Exceptions are so called ”assessment
courses” with a duration of up to two months. But since the integration chances
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for substitutes increase in accordance with the length of the substitution period
(cf. Olsson 1997), the unemployed must fundamentally show interest in courses
of longer duration.
Additionally, the funding of the substitution through the Federal
Employment Service brings the problem that the maintenance payments are
not higher than unemployment benefits (Tab. 1: 5.1, 5.2). As well as the low
short-term financial incentive for the unemployed to participate in substitution,31
this can also have negative implications for their acceptance within the
company’s social system.
Finally, the implementation of job rotation schemes calls for an enormous
degree of co-operation between the parties from politics and the economy. The,
up to now, strict separation of German labour market policy from structural and
economical policies means that one cannot expect such net-work structures to
have been widely established or institutionalised on local levels. Thus for
example, negotiations between the social partners about the framework
conditions for further training has very little tradition in comparison to other
European countries.
4.9.2. Incentive structure and evaluation
The institutional framework conditions listed here, show the incentive structures
for the participating main parties – the unemployed, the employees and the
enterprises.
It can be seen that the incentive for the unemployed to participate in job
rotation schemes is low. On the one hand, their substitution wages are little or
no improvement on unemployment benefit and their status remains the same.
On the other hand, there is also a chance that they could lose their right to
participate on another, possibly longer and more successful, labour office-run
scheme for two years if they participate in a job rotation course. These negative
incentives can only be balanced out if the unemployed have a realistic chance
of finding a permanent job through the substitution. The take-over figures and
thus the direct labour market policy success of job rotation have not yet been
systematically analysed. There are indications that the take-over quota is on a
medium range. This is probably due to the necessary concentration on small
and medium-sized enterprises.
Basicly there are more positive incentives for employees to participate in
job rotation projects. Usually they do not have to pay a share of the costs for
courses of the further training which means that their investment involves the
time needed for the course and helping to incorporate the substitute in his/her
                                           
31 An enterprise subsidy of up to DM 310,- monthly is possible under the unemployment
insurance regulations.
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workplace. Considering the increasing necessity for life-long learning, one may
speak here of a positive cost-benefit ratio.
However the institutional framework conditions described above mean that,
despite the generally positive incentive structures, the employees are not free
to decide to participate in such schemes. So long as there are no general
regulations concerning training leave, the company management usually
selects the staff members who are to participate. This results frequently in an
increase of segmentation within the company (cf. Sengenberger 1987).
In general, the incentive structure for enterprises is positive. In the
German system to date, the enterprises also only have to bear a share of the
active further training costs – this is limited to continuing the employees’ wage
payments. On the assumption that suitable substitutes are selected (this choice
of course being the highest risk factor for the enterprise), the potential increase
in the company’s competitiveness outweighs the costs incurred.
From an labour market policy viewpoint, there are, in regard to the
enterprises, so-called ‘deadweight’ effects to be discussed. All reports on the
state of the German SMEs emphasise the fact that there is a low awareness of
the necessity for strategic further training planning. This means that those
parties responsible for implementing projects must make a special effort to
include enterprises in the schemes which need assistance in protecting their
workplaces through upgrading of qualifications. If this does not succeed, there
is, in the light of the German institutional framework, a danger that the training
courses which have been planned anyway, will be subsidised for the more
active companies which will then produce detrimental effects for the other
enterprises.
Finally, these outlined incentive structures can only be accepted in the light
of the current implementation methods. It has become clear that an
implementation of job rotation especially within the present national legal
conditions would be very difficult without EU support. On the national level
there is, up to now, no public budget or suitable instrument available to update
further training for employees in the preventative sense as promoted by the
ADAPT initiative.
A summary therefore in a final assessment calls on those responsible to
improve the incentive structures for the unemployed, to provide the means for
employees to participate without European subsidies and possibly that
enterprises take more responsibility for further training also in financial terms
which could help the prevention of ‘deadweight’ effects.
Certain aspects of such a development of the framework conditions for a
long-term, nation-wide implementation of job rotation schemes in Germany will
be briefly discussed at the end of the following summary.
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5. Conclusion and outlook
The aim of this study was to theoretically develop the conditions necessary for
a nation-wide implementation of job rotation schemes in nine Member States of
the European Union and to investigate them empirically in an international
comparison.
Six separate key areas could be identified which are particularly relevant
for the expected success of job rotation schemes. These could be differentiated
in ”external” conditions, i.e. those that cannot be immediately altered through
labour market policy and instruments and in ”internal” conditions. From our
viewpoint, the external factors include the economic health of the individual
sectors and the level of competitiveness of the participating companies. On the
other hand there are factors which, for a long-lasting success of job rotation
schemes in a national context, must be influenced by political strategies: the
legal and the financial framework conditions and the prerequisites to
implementation. Indicators were specified which showed advantageous or
disadvantageous development potential for job rotation in the individual
countries. In this context, the most important indicators can be summarised as:
the legal regulations for the further training of the employed and the
unemployed, the strength of the dismissal protection laws, the financial and
political responsibility for training, the relation between unemployment benefits
and substitution payments and the co-operative structure of the regional
implementation networks.
Empirically based opinions about the actual effects of the individual
framework conditions on the success of job rotation schemes are, all in all, still
very difficult to make at this present stage of project developments in the
various European countries. The Danish example however, shows that one of
the main factors for setting up a nation-wide implementation is a combination of
just a few framework conditions:
x Far-reaching legal or collectively agreed regulations regarding further
training for the employed and practice-oriented (further) training for the
unemployed and for sections of the non-working population are necessary.
x The incentives for employees to undergo further training must be
guaranteed through the existence of appropriate regulations. Leave of
absence for the purpose of improving one’s skills must be flanked by secure
dismissal protection legislation.
x The costs incurred through job rotation projects should be ‘fairly’ distributed
through a suitable co-funding structure in order to keep the so-called
‘deadweight’ effects as low as possible.
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x The incentives for the substitution persons should be clearly positive.
Through an adequate reimbursement for substitution work, an sufficient
increase in comparison to unemployment benefits should be assured.
x Efficient regional networks are necessary in order to implement the projects
on the interface between labour market policy and structural policy.
A stable legal basis for the further training of workers has been created in
Denmark through the creation of new regulations for leave of absence. Parallel
to this, due to the right of an unemployed person to a job offer after a six month
period of unemployment, the legal as well as the financial prerequisites for the
implementation of job rotation have been created. In the context of the above-
mentioned necessary framework conditions, both of these new regulations
within the past few years appear to be the key to the successful Danish nation-
wide implementation of job rotation projects.
When taking both of these factors as fundamental prerequisites, one can
also say that along with Denmark, Finland and Sweden have also fulfilled these
conditions. Similar legal regulations are presently being drafted in Italy while in
Austria, although the new regulations need to be improved along with a useful
co-operative structure in the labour administration, the development potential
can be deemed as positive. In France, Portugal and the United Kingdom, there
is presently no legal basis tailored to job rotation. France however could create
a new innovative and, possibly in the long-term, a more successful structure for
job rotation implementation by utilising the system of the further training funds.
Portugal has also already institutionalised initial stages towards co-operative
labour market policy through the training societies, which can well provide a
foundation for new innovative legislation. Implementation in the United
Kingdom will prove more difficult. The combination of the traditionally low rate
of government activity in training both the employed and the unemployed with
the weak dismissal protection laws is certainly detrimental to the creation of
positive framework conditions offering all parties involved incentives for
enterprises to partake in job rotation. However in this case, the promising new
political developments must be observed – these could well lead to a positive
turn in integrative labour market and structural policies.
When estimating the development potential of the German model in the
light of the other nine countries compared in this study, a very positive
prognosis can be ventured. Active labour market policy in Germany focuses
traditionally on training for the unemployed and, thanks to the changes made in
the legislation governing labour market policy (SGB III), one of the barriers in
this area has been overcome: when participating in schemes run by the
employment service, unemployed persons may now undergo longer practical
training in enterprises. This deserves special mention as this is an example
how quickly the law-makers reacted to make necessary changes the need of
which was recognised through the practical implementation of job rotation. This
reflects the willingness to create more suitable framework conditions.
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On the other hand it has also become clear that more far-reaching changes
are necessary in order to achieve a labour market policy of long-term
successful job rotation implementation: the area of training for the employed is
still not covered by the German employment promotion laws which means that
the implementation of job rotation schemes is still extremely dependent on
European co-funding.
The current form of implementation in Germany offers the unemployed too
few, and the enterprises possible too many, positive incentives to participate in
job rotation schemes. An important way to tackle this problem would be through
restructuring the funding models.
For the long-term perspective, a form of funding needs to be found which is
counterpart to the current systematic logic in the Scandinavian countries and
which will simultaneously utilise their experience in order to draft ones own
long-term, workable financing concept. Corresponding to the practice in
Denmark and Finland for example, the substitutes need to be offered a better
financial incentive to participate in job rotation projects. This can be managed
by concluding a fixed-term contract with the enterprise for the duration of the
substitution period. When it is assumed that, due to lack of experience, the
substitute cannot match 100% of the productivity of the worker being
substituted but rather around 80%, then the wages could be agreed on as 80%
of the agreed union rate.
The employees undergoing further training would receive unemployment
benefit for this period which in the German unemployment insurance system
would amount to approx. 68-78% of their previous wages for a training period
of up to six months (cf. Tab.1: 5.4). Since it can be assumed that the
employees will have increased productivity after the training and will thus also
benefit from a wage increase, then they have also incentives to participate
despite the short-term decrease in wages. This would to a certain extent be an
extra burden on the unemployment insurance system as the workers
undergoing training probably have a right to higher unemployment benefits
than the substitutes. But through this change-over in financial responsibilities,
there would be such a fundamental change in the incentive structures that in
the long-term, a net benefit for the economy may be expected.32
It is clear that this restructuring of the funding has been suggested from a
mid-term to long-term perspective. However for the short-term and for a
transitory period until fundamental changes to the financing structures have
been made, more leeway for funding the substitutes could be found through
involving the social security offices to a greater extent. The social security
                                           
32 In order to exactly determine this net benefit, deadweight, ousting and substitution effects
must of course be checked and the cost-benefit ratio for all participating parties must be more
precisely estimated as was possible within the framework of this study. Here only the trends
from the analysis of the international comparison could be considered. For exactor figures
see the publication by Günther Schmid which is currently being prepared.
39
offices play an important role in any case in seeking and funding substitutes,
although their degree of involvement varies from region to region. Their
involvement is advantageous because the local social security offices may
often freely avail of certain amounts of the budgets (this applies to the local
employment service since the SGB III is in force) and also because many
experts of the regional economic structure are employed there.
In any case, a co-ordination of all parties responsible for the unemployed
(as well as the labour and social security offices, also smaller initiatives) to help
create a type of ”pool of unemployed persons” is an interesting variant in order
to lower the current high transactions costs of finding suitable substitutes.
It has been pointed out that to date no regular financial conditions, which
are independent of European funding, have been set up in Germany for the
further training of employees. In the sense of a fair co-funding form, it could be
argued that the enterprises, which have a direct interest in further training due
to the increased productivity of their employees who undergo training, should
also pay a share of the active training costs. Thus, a proportional funding from
public finances, whereby active labour market policy must be extended to
include more preventive schemes, and funding from private enterprises could
be a solution.
The developments in Denmark have shown that the participation of
enterprises in job rotation depends much on the economic climate. In the
current healthy economy, production is running at maximum capacity which
means that little freedom remains to partake in further training schemes. On the
other hand, especially the small and medium-sized enterprises – the most
important target group – have, in periods of low turnover, insufficient financial
resources to share the active costs of further training. The nation-wide
introduction of further training funds, as is practised in France for example,
would be a solution to this dilemma and would help create a fair financing
structure. In Germany also there are already in certain sectors further training
funds and their effects have been generally deemed as positive by the
enterprises. Moreover, if enterprises were to participate in a fund system, their
willingness for further training would be increased33.
Apart from disseminating an idea ”whose time has come”34 and the active
engagement of all parties involved, the successful implementation of job
rotation calls for the creation of suitable framework conditions for employees
and positive incentives for the unemployed. This is however only to be
achieved by those responsible within the political system and the enterprise
associations and is no doubt dependent on prevailing political majorities and
the balance of power.
                                           
33 This result has been described by Moraal and Schmidt (1998) for the social fund in the
scaffolding sector.
34 In context with Job Rotation a quote from Victor Hugo is often cited: ”Nothing is as powerful
as an idea whose time has come”.
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